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ABSTRACT 
In this empirical study, the focus is on the risks involved with implementing practices of Early 
Supplier Involvement (ESI) from the perspective of suppliers, which has not been given its 
due attention. For suppliers, making sense of ESI implies dealing with the following chicken-
and-egg problem: the capabilities to be offered depend on the way the business is defined and 
vice versa. In this paper, a model is presented to describe how suppliers have made sense of 
this chicken-and-egg problem. This model was used for an empirical exploration of the risks 
involved with ESI-strategies and draws significantly on theoretical and methodological 
insights of the social systems theory of the late German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. Until 
now, social systems theory has not gained much attention within organization studies. As 
such, this study also aims to illustrate some of the potential of social systems theory. 
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‘Early Supplier Involvement’ or ESI is currently in vogue as a means to foster innovation in 
supply chains. Ever since the publication of the automotive studies carried out by researchers 
of the Massachusetts’s Institute of Technology (Womack et al., 1991), the management of the 
contribution of suppliers to the product development process of Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM), whether automotive-oriented or not, has gained significant attention of 
both academics and practitioners. The automotive studies showed that Japanese car 
manufacturers that managed the contribution of their suppliers successfully were able to bring 
new automobiles to the market in shorter times, with more innovative features and with 
considerable less effort in terms of development hours with respect to engineering and 
manufacturing. It appeared that the use of the specialized capabilities of suppliers makes 
product development both more efficient and more effective (e.g. Clark, 1989; Cusumano and 
Takeishi, 1991; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993). ESI, as the relating strategy is called, however, is no 
panache. The greater responsibility of suppliers for the outcome of the product development 
process of OEM-companies does not always lead to an increase in development-performance 
(Harley et al., 1997; McCutcheon et al., 1997). In order to enhance the strategic performance 
of ESI, several improvements have been proposed (e.g. Wasti & Liker, 1997; Bonaccorsi & 
Lipparini, 1994; MacDuffie & Helper, 1997; Wynstra & Ten Pierick, 2000; Wynstra et al., 
2001). These authors have in common their strong focus on the perspective of OEM-
companies. True, it has been addressed that often suppliers have little or no experience in joint 
product development and that their level of technical capabilities is below par, but the focus 
has remained what OEM-companies can do about these problems. Existing literature ignores 
the problems experienced by a certain category of suppliers, i.e. ‘jobbers’, in dealing with ESI 
and the way they deal with these problems. In this paper, we will present the findings of an 
empirical research in this respect. It will become clear that these suppliers can choose 
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risks that may jeopardize the ESI-strategy. 
Theoretical Framework 
Previous research on ESI from the perspective of suppliers is primarily focused on 
‘component suppliers’ (McCutcheon et al., 1997; Wasti & Liker, 1997; Afuah, 2000, 
Takeishi, 2001). These type of companies supply parts that are entirely developed as their 
standard products (Clark et al., 1987, p.741). In this study the focus is upon suppliers that, 
until now, have offered production capabilities to realize ‘detail controlled parts’, which are 
parts that are developed entirely by OEM-companies from basic to detailed engineering 
(Clark et al., 1987, p. 741). Companies busy with this type of business are regularly referred 
to as ‘jobbers’ (Woodward, 1965, p. 39). From previous research, it turned out that jobbers 
experience difficulties to engage successfully in ESI. It appeared to be of key importance to 
make clear how they do business with their customers (Vos et al., 1998). Therefore, it may be 
of importance to observe how these suppliers of detailed controlled parts have redefined their 
business to make sense of the capabilities necessary to engage in ESI. For this, we have 
chosen to investigate the way suppliers have made sense of this phenomenon (Weick, 1979) 
by means of the social systems theory of the late German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1927-
1998). Just as sensemaking is key for organizations to Weick, ‘Sinn’ or meaning is key to 
Luhmann’s conception of social life. Unfortunately, this is not the place to deal with 
Luhmann’s social systems theory at great length because of its overwhelming size. His own 
personal bibliography dated at January 1996 accounts for over 50 books and almost 400 
papers. As a result, presenting social systems theory implies that you need to confine yourself 
to a limited description of this theory, which apparently has made the comprehension of this 
theory far from easy or obvious (see King (2001) for an interesting overview of the 
misconceptions of Luhmann’s sociological program). Nonetheless, it can be argued that 
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observation (Luhmann, 1984). After Luhmann’s ‘autopoietische Wende’ or paradigmatic turn 
to autopoiesis in the late 1970s, this observational focus has become more and more apparent. 
In fact, all his publications after his 1984 book ‘Soziale Systeme’ on art, religion, economics, 
pedagogies, law, politics, love, science, etc. can be seen as descriptions of these autopoietical 
social phenomena based upon Spencer-Brown’s calculus of forms (1972) and Von Foerster’s 
second-order-cybernetics (1979 & 1981). Indeed, it would be very difficult not see 
Luhmann’s conception of communication as observation, i.e. for social systems to 
communicate means to observe and to observe means to communicate. 
Within social systems theory, communication is regarded as self-referential (Luhmann, 1984). 
The concept of self-reference implies that when the social system reflects upon its existence, 
which is an operation by itself, it finds out that the relationship with its environment depends 
on itself. As a result, the social system tautologically finds out that it is what it is, which 
implies that the social system needs to conclude that its environment is the product of self-
observation. Consequently, the social system paradoxically finds out that while observing its 
environment it is observing itself and not itself. Therefore, social systems cannot decide 
whether they observe themselves or not, which leads to the conclusion that social systems 
cannot identify themselves while identifying themselves. 
The fact that self-observation is trapped in either tautological or paradoxical reasoning 
indicates that there is a limit to the knowledge social systems can obtain about themselves and 
their environment. The function of tautology and paradox is to indicate the ultimate 
complexity experienced by social systems, which forces them to do something to escape self-
referential closure. Social systems that carry out operations (i.e. communications), 
autologically distinguish between self-reference (‘Selbstreferenz’) and hetero-reference 
(‘Fremdreferenz’) and in the process ‘de-tautologize’ and ‘de-paradoxalize’ themselves. As a 
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environment throughout time. Once operational, the self-referential system can reflect on the 
unity of its operations. In terms of Spencer-Brown (1972), this reflection takes the form of a 
‘re-entry’ of the system/environment-distinction into the system. As we have seen, the re-
entry takes the form of either tautology or paradox. The reason why these phenomena occur 
when a system tries to observe itself with the system/environment-distinction is due to the fact 
that the one who is referring and the subject he/she is referring to cannot be the same at the 
same time. During self-observations you cannot observe that you are busy with observing 
yourself. In other words, the act of self-observation is the ‘blind spot’ of the self-observation. 
It seems therefore quite ironic that, while reflecting upon their being there, social systems find 
out that they stumble upon a problem, which they have already solved by means of blissful 
self-ignorance, i.e. their existence. Nonetheless, the inherent blind spots may undermine the 
self-reproduction of social systems because they lead to indecision. For this reason, there are 
inherent risks involved in dealing with self-reference. 
The observation of the risks involved with the way jobbers have redefined their business to 
make sense of the capabilities necessary to engage in ESI, implies that we need to observe 
how these jobbers have made their ESI-strategy happen by making sense or ‘solving’ the 
following strategic chicken-and-egg problem in distinguishing between themselves (self-
reference) and their environment (hetero-reference) (Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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(1)  The business to be defined depends on the capabilities to be offered 
(2)  The capabilities to be offered depend on the business to be defined 
[…] 
In making sense of this problem of infinite regress, suppliers stumble upon self-reference. 
That is, while being busy with self-observation, they need to conclude that the problem they 
face only exists because they created it themselves. This problem is similar to the problem of 
the Baron of Münchhausen who needed to pull himself out of the swamp by his own hair. In 
order to solve the chicken-and-egg problem, suppliers can give meaning tautologically to 
either (a) their businesses in the sense that they could be what they could be or to (b) their 
capabilities in the sense that they, again, could be what they could be. The first option relates 
to an outside/in-approach to strategy and the latter to an inside/out-approach. It should be 
mentioned, however, that no social system starts form scratch or ‘ex nihilo’(Luhmann, 1986), 
which implies that a new strategic self-description based upon the business/capability-
distinction of Figure 1 is part of an already solved chicken-and-egg-problem related to the 
same distinction and that may or may not structure or ‘structurate’ (Giddens, 1984) the way 
both tautological arguments become ‘asymmetrised’ or ‘unfolded’ (Luhmann, 1984) 
throughout time (Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The ‘re-entry’ (Spencer-Brown, 1972; Luhmann, 1994) of the business/capability-distinction 
into the same distinction can appear at both sides of the distinction. In the left part of Figure 2, 
the distinction re-appears at the business-side of the distinction, which leads to the following 
self-reflective question. 
  81. ‘What could our future businesses and capabilities be given our past businesses?’ 
Likewise, when the distinction re-appears at the capability-side of the distinction (i.e. the right 
part of Figure 2), the following self-reflective question results. 
2. ‘What could our future businesses and capabilities be given our past capabilities?’ 
In either case, the chicken-and-egg problem as depicted in Figure 1 needs to be solved. 
Confronted with the tautological arguments underlying the chicken-and-egg problem, 
organizational members experience an excess of opportunities to choose from in defining the 
future ESI-strategy. To prevent inability to choose from happening, therefore, the only way to 
define the future strategy is by just doing something. Therefore, dealing with self-reference in 
making sense of strategic issues involves acting naively to become operational (Vos, 2002). In 
system theoretical terms the function of naivety is to temporalize complexity to create reality. 
As a result of the naivety involved, each choice made by suppliers to solve their strategic 
chicken-and-egg problem and to make sense of ESI, is in large extent contingent and therefore 
inherently risky. After all, the company could have chosen to do otherwise. 
Yet, as mentioned above, it is to be expected that the past communication of suppliers both 
enable and constrain their future communication. That is, depending on which side of the 
distinction the distinction re-appears, self-reference and hetero-reference will be unfolded by 
means of answering the relating self-reflective question mentioned above. Within strategy 
literature this structuration of future actions by means of past actions is known as the 
‘dominant logic’ of companies (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986 and Bettis & Prahalad, 1995) that 
enables and constrains the way they deal with strategic issues. In answering each of the two 
self-reflective questions, two alternatives exist (Figure 3). The point in finding these answers 
is to observe how one’s future operations are based recursively on one’s past operations, 
whether the future operations are aimed at the reproduction of past operations or at the 
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chosen to engage successfully in ESI and (2) the risks involved with each of these 
alternatives. The risks are of importance to determine the dysfunctionalities of the alternatives 
or functional equivalents presented in Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Methodology 
The empirical research is aimed at observing the self-descriptions of the strategy of jobbers 
that were in the midst of making sense of ESI. To explore this, we have conducted five in 
depth case studies, which will be presented here in concise form. The case study design 
chosen can be described as an embedded multiple-case design (Yin, 1994, p. 39). The design 
was embedded because each case study had two units of analysis, i.e. the present and future 
business strategy of a supplier of detailed controlled parts. The case study design was multiple 
because the business strategies of five companies were described and analyzed. In addition, 
the case study design employs the logic of literal replication (Yin, 1994, p. 46) because each 
case was carefully selected to be homogeneous or similar with respect to the ‘independent 
variable’. That is, the cases were selected because of similarity with respect to phenomenon of 
interest, i.e. sensemaking of ESI. 
The field research was carried out in association with two organizations that both took an 
interest in supporting small and medium sized enterprises, not necessarily suppliers, with 
respect to providing knowledge and support in answering strategic knowledge questions. In 
association with these parties, a mailing was carried out to introduce us to 20 companies, 
which were probably willing to participate in the research. Of these companies, 19 replied 
positively and 17 companies were investigated eventually. Within this set of 17 companies, 
seven companies were found that were involved with ESI. The ESI-strategies of five of these 
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were in the midst of making sense of ESI. Therefore, both the present strategy, that was not 
entirely oriented towards ESI, and the future strategy, that was oriented towards ESI, could be 
described. The remaining two companies already practiced ESI for some years and as a result 
were considered of less relevance to the research. The group interviews were joined by 
organizational members that were busy with making sense of ESI. The fact that both a 
company’s present and future strategy was described made it possible to measure the strategy 
on two distinct time-intervals at one single point in time. This was in fact a trick to describe 
two distinct business strategies that otherwise could only have been described by means of 
conducting a longitudinal research. By this maneuver, it became possible to determine the 
way the business/capability-distinction re-appeared into itself. 
In applying social systems theory it is important to note that the former considerations about 
the research method chosen have little to do with the methodology associated with this theory. 
In fact, it can be argued that case study designs are ‘loosely coupled’ with respect to the way 
one ought to perceive social reality. After all, once is decided upon a case study design, one 
still needs to decide upon relevant theoretical points of view and research techniques to be 
used, whether these techniques are qualitative and/or quantitative. It is Luhmann’s opinion 
that a theory should be accompanied by a method and vice versa. The starting point of 
Luhmann’s social systems theory is the ultimate complexity brought forth by the self-
referential distinction between system and environment. Social systems need to asymmetrise 
or reduce this circular complexity to become operational. Luhmann’s functional method can 
be seen as a means to observe the way social systems reduce this complexity and to put their 
attempts into theoretical perspective. For this, Luhmann uses the distinction between first and 
second-order observation, which he took from Von Foerster’s second order cybernetics (1979 
& 1981). 
  11With first-order empirical observations, the aim is to observe how social systems observe. 
Likewise, with second-order empirical observations, the aim is to observe what social systems 
cannot observe because of the way they observe (i.e. the blind spots of social systems). It is 
apparent that for second-order observation the researcher needs an observational-framework 
that is more comprehensive or complex than the framework in use by the observed social 
system. In both cases, however, the research is focused on the various ways or functional 
equivalents with which social systems ‘de-tautologize’ and ‘de-paradoxalize’ themselves. The 
ultimate goal of functional analysis is to compare these functional equivalents on their 
dysfunctionalities, as can be illustrated by means of the statement that ‘complexity leads to 
selectivity, selectivity to selections, selections to contingency and contingency to risk’ 
(Luhmann, 1984, p. 47). The notion of function as used by Luhmann is different from what is 
generally defined as function within functionalistic social systems theory. Contrary to 
Parsons, Luhmann considers functions not as mechanisms that produce social order. Instead, 
function is considered to be a regulative heuristic scheme to compare the ways social 
problems are solved and to observe the unintended consequences of these functional 
equivalents (Luhmann, 1974, p. 14). The unity of theory and method is established through 
the fact that social systems theory regards complexity as the ultimate problem of social 
systems and the functional method focuses on problems and solutions of social systems in this 
respect. 
The main implication for second-order observation is that some functional frame of reference 
is necessary to compare various functional equivalents to each other, whether this frame of 
reference is available beforehand or is the result of empirical explorations. Consequently, 
first-order observation relates to the observation of social phenomena as an insider and 
second-order observation relates to the observation of these phenomena as an outsider. Both 
types of observations, however, are self-referential and are as such paradoxical: as an insider 
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the scientific system. Due to these paradoxes, both first and second-order observation have 
their blind spots or un-decidabilities of which a social researchers needs to take account. The 
un-decidability of first-order observation is that you cannot know if your observations truly 
grasp the specifics or not of the communications of the social systems observed. Likewise, the 
un-decidability of second-order observation is that you cannot know whether your 
observations or reflections on the blind spots of first-order observations are true in the sense 
that they get acknowledged by the scientific system. This implies that social systems theory 
explicitly subscribes to the fact that there is no meaning with respect to social reality, which is 
not shadowed by the ignorance it sustains (Baecker, 2001: 71). The first-order methodological 
problems were ‘solved’ by means of letting the participants communicate about several 
strategic issues. Besides this interference, the inquirer interfered to keep the autopoiesis or 
self-reproduction of the communication about the strategic issues going on. Lastly, the 
inquirer interfered when the sensemaking with respect to a strategic issue had come to a 
closure, whether the participants agreed that they agreed or whether they agreed to disagree. 
The second-order methodological problems were dealt with by means of a configuration 
theory (Vos, 2002, p. 90-103) that enabled the comparison between the strategic reality as 
observed by the companies and an ideal-typical description of various strategic realities 
dependent on the business-type enacted. 
Findings of First-Order Observations 
The first-order observation of the strategic self-description of the suppliers involved, was done 
by means of group interviews based upon a standardized research tool that enabled the 
‘verstehen’ and ‘mißverstehen’ of the strategic communication within the resource limits of 
the research. This research tool modeled the way self-reference was unfolded with respect to 
of six strategic decisions, three of which were oriented externally (business, added values and 
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operating procedures). The resulting strategic self-descriptions were ‘triangulated’ by means 
of brochures of the companies that were aimed to inform potential customers. Each brochure 
contained a self-description of the businesses and the capabilities of a company and consisted 
of both written and photographical material. As such, these brochures could function as 
supplemental evidence to determine how the companies unfolded self-reference with respect 
to the business/capability-distinction and made sense of ESI in the process. 
The strategic self-descriptions of these companies are too comprehensive to present them here 
in full detail. As such, the results of the first-order observations are reduced to the way the 
business/capability-distinction (Figure 1) was asymmetrised and are presented in Table I.  
 
Insert Table I about here 
 
From this table it appears that each supplier has unfolded self-reference with respect to the 
business/capability distinction with a preference for the capability-side of the distinction. This, 
however, seems to make sense. From the self-descriptions it appeared that, for jobbers to be 
jobbers, the self-reproduction of their capabilities on a continuous basis by means of acquiring 
and carrying out assignments secures their existence. That is, because of their capabilities the 
elemental operations or communications become ‘anschlußfähig’ or connectable to each other 
throughout time. As such, it comes as no surprise that the business/capability distinction is 
asymmetrised by enacting capabilities first instead of businesses. Supplemental evidence for 
this observation of the way jobbers create meaning can be found in their brochures. The 
pictures contained in the brochure of each company particularly highlight characteristics of 
the members and the production equipment of the organization (see for example Figure 4). 
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With respect to the future strategic self-descriptions a more differentiated view appears. One 
company has asymmetrised the business/capability-distinction by enacting capabilities (case 
4) and four by means of enacting businesses (case 1, 2, 3 and 5). The preference of the latter 
group of suppliers to strategically focus on businesses was accounted for by means of the 
argument that the capabilities were of course of prime importance but that the acquirement of 
assignments related to ESI were also indispensable for the development of the necessary 
capabilities. Note that this in fact a reformulation of the underlying chicken-and-egg problem 
of Figure 1. The management of the company that enacted the capabilities first, argued that 
the company should acquire assignments in the future only for the prototyping of products to 
be manufactured and assembled in series by others, even when this meant a formal leave of 
the present business strategy and a loss of employability. 
Despite these dissimilarities between both groups of suppliers, there is also a similarity to be 
found. All suppliers have defined future strategies that radically break with their past 
strategies. The suppliers of case 3, 4 and 5 highlighted that, due to the high wages in the 
Netherlands, the production in series of the products of their customers should be moved to 
low-wages countries in the near future. Staying ahead of competitors was the main reason for 
the suppliers of case 1 and 2 to redefine their strategy. Comparing the past and future 
strategies, it appeared that each supplier aimed to maintain the existing relationships with 
customers. That is, the ‘dominant logic’ is the reproduction of the present customers in the 
future strategy (alternative I of Figure 3). Within case 4, alternative I-B was to chosen to make 
sense of ESI and within case 1, 2, 3 and 5 alternative I-A was chosen. 
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The second-order observation of the strategic self-description of the suppliers involved, 
relates to the observation of the blind spots or un-decidabilities of their future strategy. The 
question to be answered therefore is to which extent the suppliers involved have ‘de-
tautologized’ and ‘de-paradoxalized’ themselves successfully. In short, what is the ignorance 
sustained by the way the suppliers communicate about ESI? 
Within case 1, 2, 3 and 5, each supplier has defined its future business as dealing with the 
engineering, manufacturing and assembling of products or parts of products owned by their 
customers. In contrast to their present business, the focus is now not upon the realization of 
products only but on the design and realization of these products. That is, these suppliers use 
ESI as a means to enhance both the functionality and the manufacturability of the products of 
their customers. The necessary future capabilities, however, are defined in very general terms 
as engineering, manufacturing and assembling technologies. In fact, the suppliers have 
defined their capabilities in the same terms as they define their businesses. As a result, while 
being busy with making sense of ESI by means of the business/capability-distinction, the 
distinction between functionality and manufacturability re-entries within the capability part of 
the former distinction (Figure 5). 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Consequently, the suppliers stumble upon another chicken-and-egg problem: the capabilities 
necessary to enhance the functionality of the customer’s products depend on the capabilities 
necessary to enhance the manufacturability of these products and vice versa. The occurrence 
of this chicken-and-egg problem is a sign that the suppliers of case 1, 2, 3 and 5 have failed to 
‘de-tautologize’ the capability part of alternative I-A (Figure 3). It seems that these suppliers 
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capabilities by not defining them. As a consequence, the un-decidability of the ESI-strategy 
employed relates to the capabilities necessary to enhance both the functionality and the 
manufacturability of the products of their customers. 
Within case 4, the supplier has not chosen to focus on both the functionality and manufac-
turability of products or parts of products. This supplier enhances only the manufacturability 
of the sheet metal subassemblies and products of their customers. In order to enhance this 
manufacturability, the supplier aims to realize a prototype of subassemblies specific to the 
customer that can be manufactured both effectively and efficiently in series by other parties in 
countries with low-wages. For this reason, this supplier has defined ‘Design-for-Assembly’ as 
its main future capability. It seems, however, that the supplier has not defined the prototypes 
to be realized in great detail. That is, the supplier has not chosen yet the manufacturability of 
which prototypes should be enhanced. As a result, while being busy with making sense of ESI 
by means of the business/capability-distinction, the distinction between prototypes ‘Design-
for-Assembly’ (DFA) re-entries within the business part of the former distinction (Figure 6). 
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
The main difference between the chicken-and-egg problem of Figure 5 and Figure 6 is that 
within the former, both sides of the distinction remain ‘tautologized’, whereas in the latter 
only one side of the distinction remains a tautology. For this reason, the supplier of case 4 has 
only failed to ‘de-tautologize’ the circular argument that the prototypes to be realized depend 
on the prototypes to be realized. As a consequence, paradoxically, it seems this supplier has 
and has not succeeded in asymmetrizing the business part of alternative I-B (Figure 3). That 
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manufacturability should be enhanced by means of DFA. 
The last step of the functional analysis of the way jobbers make sense of ESI involves a 
comparison of the functional equivalents observed within the case studies to determine the 
risks involved with the blind spots of these functional equivalents. This means that the blind 
spots should be observed by means of another way of observation that puts the attempts of the 
suppliers involved with the case studies in perspective. For this, the distinction between 
suppliers which offer capabilities in designing artifacts (e.g. firms of consulting engineers) 
and those which offer capabilities in realizing artifacts (e.g. jobbers) presents itself (Van 
Gunsteren, 1987; Vos et al. 1998; Vos, 2002). Companies that recursively solve design-
problems throughout time, can become capable in applying solution-principles (e.g. the use of 
gravity to position objects) independent of the specific goods or services designed for 
customers in the here and now (Vos, 2002, p. 97). Likewise, companies that recursively 
realize designs throughout time, can become competent in applying realization-principles (e.g. 
the use of lathing to realize rotation-symmetric objects) independent of the specific goods or 
services realized for customers in the here and now (Vos, 2002, p. 97). Because these 
companies become capable in applying their knowledge and skills independent of specific 
assignments by means of reflexivity and reflection, they can deal with the ignorance sustained 
with respect to the specifics of the artifacts to be designed, respectively realized. 
Paradoxically, jobbers seem to function because of their ability to deal with their inabilities. 
The ignorance sustained by the suppliers involved with case 1, 2, 3 and 5, relates to the 
specifics of the capabilities to enhance both the functionality and manufacturability of 
products of their customers. In terms of the distinction between offering capabilities in 
designing and realizing artifacts, these suppliers try to enact two distinct business-types at the 
same time, which leads to the oscillation between necessary solution and realization-
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independent of specific assignments, which may lead to the inability of the organization to 
function as a whole. As turned out from our empirical observations, most suppliers experience 
severe difficulties in acquiring assignments of customers to make their planned strategy a 
success. Therefore, ironically, it seems as if these suppliers jeopardize or risk their existence 
by means of they way they try to remain existent. 
The ignorance sustained by the supplier of case 4, relates to the specifics of the prototypes of 
which the manufacturability should be enhanced by means of DFA. Using the explanation or 
description of the recursive self-reproduction of capabilities in realizing, it appears that this 
ignorance or un-decidability is a conditio sine qua non for jobbers to function properly. To 
bring the functional analysis of this specific ESI-strategy to a close, it appears that the risks 
involved with the blind spot of the ESI-strategy are inherent to the functioning of this 
prototyping-strategy and manageable because the recursive self-reproduction of the 
capabilities seemingly takes place independent of the prototypes to be developed. 
Discussion 
One may wonder, on this point, how Japanese suppliers within the automotive industry have 
succeeded in preventing the capability trap. After all, it appeared, from the automotive studies 
concerning Japanese supplier involvement in design, that 51% of the total engineering hours 
were spent by suppliers (Clark et al, 1987, p. 741; Womack et al, 1991, p. 157). Apparently, 
this fact becomes unexplainable when we take into consideration that only 8% of the 
engineering related to ‘supplier proprietary parts’ (Clark et al, 1987, p. 741; Womack et al, 
1991, p. 157). These are parts that are ‘developed entirely by parts suppliers as their standard 
products’ (Clark et al, 1987, p. 741). This implies that 92% of the engineering done by 
suppliers related to parts and subassemblies owned by car manufacturers. Have these suppliers 
found some kind of magic strategic alternative to stay out of the capability trap? 
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whose basic engineering is done by automakers, while detailed engineering is done by parts 
suppliers’ and 30% to ‘detail-controlled parts’, i.e. ‘parts developed entirely by car makers 
from basic to detailed engineering’ (Clark et al, 1987, p. 741). Apparently, the latter category 
relates the supply of parts were ESI is not a standard practice and, therefore, the detail-
controlled parts can be regarded as ‘standard’ jobbing practices, i.e. the manufacturing (not 
the engineering) of parts according to the specifications of customers. This leaves still 62% 
involvement of suppliers in engineering to be explained. 
One reasonable explanation is that the detailed engineering of the black box parts concerns the 
re-engineering of parts with respect to their manufacturability. That is, changing the design 
such that it becomes more effective and efficient to manufacture. The fact that suppliers are 
capable to do this, is not surprising because suppliers offering capabilities in realizing to their 
customers, become capable in applying their technologies independent of the goods or 
services realized in the here and now. In other words, these suppliers become capable in the 
evaluation of the drawings of designs with respect to their manufacturability. Therefore, the 
capability of suppliers in detailed engineering could more appropriate be labeled production 
engineering (Clark et al., 1987, p. 734). The involvement of suppliers in production 
engineering has, however, nothing to do with improving the functionality of product designs 
of customers. Therefore, it can be concluded that Japanese suppliers involved with ESI, did 
not find a magic strategic alternative to stay out of the capability trap in designing and 
realizing the products of their customers. That is because Japanese suppliers of detailed 
controlled parts do not focus on the functionality of the product designs of their customers. 
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis, relates to the apparent 
fact that during the automotive studies no Japanese suppliers were involved in improving both 
the functionality and the manufacturability of the designs of their customers. It would be 
  20interesting to know whether this is changed during the last decade. Unfortunately, literature 
that is just as comprehensive on various kinds of ESI and as detailed in its measures on 
product development as the paper by Clark et. al (1987) is fairly rare. Most literature relates to 
‘component suppliers’ and not to suppliers involved with offering capabilities in 
manufacturing (e.g. McCutcheon et al., 1997; Wasti & Liker, 1997; Afuah, 2000; Takeishi, 
2001). An exception to this rule is the paper by Bidault et al. (1998). In this paper, the extent 
to which manufacturers adopted ESI in their product development process is explored. The 
authors distinguished between five levels of ESI (Bidault et al., 1998, p. 727). It appears that 
87% (level 1, 2 and 3) of the ESI-practices of suppliers relates to production engineering. The 
ESI-practices of level 5 relate to component suppliers or what Clark et al (1987) label 
‘supplier proprietary parts’. In addition, these figures highlight that no suppliers were active in 
designing and manufacturing parts or components (level 4). So just as with the Japanese 
automotive studies, this study indicates that it is not a common practice for suppliers offering 
capabilities in realizing to their customers to focus on both the functionality and the 
manufacturability of product designs. 
Conclusions 
From this empirical research, it appears the preference of researchers involved with ESI to 
focus on the perspective of OEM-companies, has prevented researchers from observing how 
the suppliers to these companies struggle to make sense of ESI. In that respect, this empirical 
research is as a first attempt to fill this void. Further research, however, is necessary to 
observe the inherent risks involved with the strategic alternatives to ESI (II-A and II-B of 
Figure 3), which were not observed in the sample of suppliers busy with making sense of ESI. 
The findings of our study are also of importance to OEM-companies because it offers them an 
alternative to involve suppliers of detailed controlled parts earlier in the development of their 
products. That is, OEM-companies can put into action these suppliers as pilot plant for the 
  21development of more efficient and effective ways to produce subassemblies, i.e. to make 
business of enhancing the manufacturability of product designs, which implies both 
improving the design and the production methods. For jobbers or suppliers of detailed 
controlled parts, this strategic maneuver to ‘design for manufacturability’ (Wheelwright & 
Clark, 1992) could imply that, once the prototypes are accomplished, the recurring production 
of series could be contracted out to manufacturers located in countries where labor costs are 
lower. 
Within this empirical application of the social systems theory, it seems worth noting that we 
have considered suppliers to experience both agency and structure. According to Pfeffer, most 
strategy researchers view organizations as isolated units confronting a faceless environment 
(Pfeffer, 1987, p. 120). In system theoretical terms this implies a preference to observe the 
system/environment-distinction as a re-entry within the system-part of the same distinction. 
That is, observing the way organizations observe themselves as being autonomous towards 
their environment. Naturally, the re-entry within the environment-part of the 
system/environment distinction is also possible. The former alternative suggests that 
organizations have ‘strategic choice’ (Child, 1972 & 1997), whereas the latter re-entry 
suggests that organizations are subjected to ‘strategic contingency’ so that there is little choice 
(Donaldson, 1985 & 1997). By means of social systems theory and functional analysis, both 
perspectives can be observed because social systems are considered to be autonomous with 
respect to their environment (Luhmann, 1984, p. 478) but at the same time they are forced to 
deal with their environment (Luhmann, 2000a, p. 15). As such, social systems theory seems to 
offer organization researchers an interesting alternative to renew the long-standing 
structure/agency-debate. The view of social systems theory in this respect is very much in line 
with what is called ‘the paradox of human agency’: human agency becomes human bondage 
because of the very nature of human agency (Dawe, 1979, p. 398). This appeared also from 
  22our empirical investigations because the suppliers involved became trapped in their own 
structures of meaning both because and despite of their agency. 
Our findings illustrate the importance of managers to enact strategic decisions symbolically 
(cf. Weick, 1987). In this study strategic decision-making was framed as a phenomenon that 
involved communication by a group of managers rather than the actions of individual 
managers and as such offers a way to observe decision-making not from an humanistic or 
subjectivist point of view. As such, social systems theory may be of benefit to the 
sensemaking perspective of Weick. After all, while Weick regards sensemaking as self-
referential (Weick, 1995, p. 23), the role of self-reference is not elaborated on much further by 
him and as a consequence rigorous empirical research after sensemaking remains quite 
difficult. 
Until now, social systems theory has got a chilly reception in organization studies, if it is 
referred to altogether. Mingers (2002, p. 119) for instance criticizes Luhmman’s idea of 
decisions being the elemental operations of organizations for being old-fashioned. However, 
this should not be read as if decision-making is the elemental operation of managers (cf. 
Simon, 1960). In terms of Luhmann’s social systems theory this view of decision-making 
involves the reduction of communication to the actions (decisions) of persons (Luhmann, 
1984, p. 240). Observing decision-making from an autopoietical perspective highlights the 
significance and insignificance of managerial control, a ‘myth’ that is enacted by both 
managers and subordinates (Luhmann, 2000b, p. 138-139). As such, social systems theory 
appears to be far from old-fashioned. The critical remarks of e.g. Stacey should be considered 
as major ill-readings of social systems theory. Stacey has missed the point when he states that 
‘Luhmann splits communication off from human bodies’ (Stacey, 2001, p. 242). That is 
definitely not the case because within social systems theory, body language (in the sense of an 
utterance) is as important as it is for Stacey. In addition, the ‘focus on the conservation of 
  23identity’ (Stacey, 2001, p. 242) does not apply to social systems theory. After all, as was 
illustrated within this paper, its identity is something a social system cannot identify while 
identifying it. Therefore, ironically, Stacey the view of organizations as ‘complex responsive 
processes’ seems to be more in agreement with social systems theory as he is willing to admit. 
Lastly, our observations are self-referential also, which indicates that our findings do not exist 
independent from our way of observation. That is, we have ‘verletzt’ or injured the reality as 
experienced by the companies involved in the very act of observation. What could we have 
differently? From theoretical perspective, we could have observed not only the content of 
strategy but also the strategy process and context (Pettigrew, 1987). Notwithstanding this 
observation, in comparison to the strategy process (e.g. emerging strategies) and strategy 
context (e.g. corporate governance), research that deals with the way organizations enact 
strategic concepts is rather under explored. It is our opinion that the ‘micro view’ on 
communication as offered by social systems theory, is pre-eminently suitable to observe the 
way organizational members enact strategic concepts to make sense of the 
system/environment-distinction (see also Henry & Seidl (2003)). From a methodological 
perspective, we could have chosen not to do interviews to carry out our first-order 
observations. In that case, the strategic self-descriptions would not have been related primarily 
to the communication between the researcher and the managers but foremost to the 
communications between the managers. As such, ‘truer’ or less injured self-descriptions 
would have been possible. For this reason, more research is necessary to observe the 
ignorance sustained by our way of observation. Consequently, we can only preliminary 
presume that jobbers that wish to engage in ESI and try to improve the functionality as well as 
the manufacturability of the product designs jeopardize their self-reproduction. So perhaps 
practitioners should not take our findings to seriously (i.e. except for this statement). After all, 
  24ironically, the blind spot of the first-order observer is the construction of the second-order 
observer. 
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Making Sense of ESI
 
Figure 1: The Business/Capability-Distinction 












Figure 2: Re-Entry of the Business/Capability-Distinction into the Distinction 
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Figure 4: A ‘typical’ Way Jobbers present themselves to the outside World 








Figure 5: Another Chicken-and-Egg Problem 






Figure 6: Another Chicken-and-Egg Problem 
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